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DIVISIONAL REPORTING BY
DIVERSIFIED CORPORATIONS:
AN ANALYST'S VIEW
DAVID NoRR*

With the growth of financial markets and the broadening of stock
ownership, new rules have been needed to improve the investment process.
The size and complexity of business have produced confusion. How can an
investor simplify complex companies and understand the economic forces
at work?
The answer is to isolate the leading factors, to break out the trends at
work, to show the strong points as well as the weak points. Divisional data
may enable investors to focus more precisely and to do better research on
the salient features of a company. The investor may then be less imbued
with concepts, such as pollution, and instilled with a better awareness of the
economics of an industry.
Why should the investor be better informed? There are believed to be
about 26 million Americans with security holdings. Many others are indirectly affected by pension benefits. The dollars invested by these people, the
owners of the business, reach $661 billion, for the New York Stock Exchange
alone. The institutionalization of investment in the United States may be
one of the greatest forces for general good; it is indeed remarkable.
To what extent do analysts try to use this approach of divisional results?
When the food analyst appraises Ralston Purina, he assesses the gross
margin on (1) soybeans and meal; (2) poultry, and the price of hogs and
steers. (This illustration was first used in 1967 when these trends were
most unfavorable; today the picture may be reversed.) When the electrical
equipment group - say General Electric - is analyzed, we break the company into more meaningful components. There may well be over one hundred profit centers, but remember, we are only concerned with material
contributors, say 10 percent or more of the net. This may well require a
lumping or aggregating of related areas.
At General Telephone, once again a divisional approach is required on
telephone operations and then the various manufacturing sectors.
In short, we seek to break down large aggregates into smaller sectors
with homogeneous parts. It is then necessary to find the central economic
feature underlying each division. Are prices the key; gross margins; added
volume; new technology? Of course, in major companies such as General
Electric, a general grouping such as "utility" covers countless products generating, transmission, distribution- with varying margins, growth rates
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and degree of risk. Nonetheless, an investor is put on notice that the economic features here differ from a category of "defense" or "industrial."
Management breakdown
Quite naturally management is expected to decide upon the breakdown
of operations. This is logical and proper; management after all is in a
position to know most about its own operations. Management is accustomed
to running its business, receiving reports on operations, and making policy
decisions. The information sought is a very normal outgrowth.
Competitive Secrets
At the same time no industrial secrets will be given to competitors.
Costs of production of particular products are not disclosed. Groupings are
to be made of fairly large size.
Thus, from the Litton report for fiscal 1969:1

Business systems &cequipment
Defense 8c marine systems
Industrial systems &equipment
Professional services &cequipment

Sales 8c Service
Revenues by
Product Line

Operating Profit
(before interest
taxes, etc.)

$607,703,000
570,078,000
656,970,000
372,887,000

$32,607,000
45,681,000
64,750,000
37,974,000

Surely even as small a breakdown as $373 million of sales with a 10 percent margin covers a multiplicity of products and trends. Yet it is a start
towards improved analysis. Parenthetically, a Litton executive decried the
proposal for divisional earnings a few years ago.
1 1969 Annual Report of Litton Industries2 Product groups &operating units

Electrical
Consumer &consumer durable
Automotive
Compressors
Turbines
Pumps
Controls &meters
MLW-Worthington Ltd.
Engineering &contract services
Air conditioning, heating and
refrigeration
Turbines, compressors &pumps international
Corporate:
Intercompany eliminations
and adjustments

Financial statement, § 21.
Income before federal
Sales
taxes
-income
$143,767,000
79,144,000
128,431,000
72,695,000
59,604,000
56,079,000
38,761,000
37,468,000
13,790,000

$20,818,000
17,321,000
11,314,000
8,670,000
5,152,000
4,980,000
3,159,000
2,060,000
(1,956,000)

54,664,000

1,468,000

52,745,000

5,569,000

(27,169,000)

$709,979,000
1968 Annual Report of Studebaker Worthington Inc. at 13.

$78,555,000

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

Then, too, most people in a field seem to be pretty well aware of the
economics of an ammonia plant, or costs of marketing gasoline. Trade publications, engineering studies and consultants are all available to provide
professional investors - let alone industrial managers - with such data.
It should also be clear from the Litton illustration or Studebaker, 2 that
we do not expect investors to compare the business systems division of Litton
with that of IBM. The product mix of each company may be unique. The
value of divisional earnings will be in understanding a company, with comparisons a minor element.
How wisely will the information be used? This, of course, is impossible
to determine in advance. If indeed the added data is too complex for the
average shareholder, it may still be a boon to what the Wheat report calls
the financial intermediary, i.e., the financial analyst at the brokerage house
or institution who stands ready to examine and question.
Will such disclosure result in a chorus of shareholder criticism, inhibiting management from risk-taking, thereby depriving the economy and
shareholders of new developments? I know of few companies particularly
responsive to the howls of the mob. The move to corporate democracy has
resulted in one-day-a-year exhibitionists and other gadflies dealing in a host
of trivia. I think few executives take this seriously. But if the overseas efforts
of Deere c Co. go on year after year with little sign of improvement, don't
shareholders have the right to question management - when will this reach
the breakeven -

why hasn't it -

what can be done to improve operations -

what is the ultimate potential?
Interestingly, I think that when a new management goes into a sick
company, one of the first steps is to review and establish cost centers, to find
out where the problems lie - why the rate of return is disappointing. I find
managements impressive when they exhibit an awareness of these divisions;
they know where to focus their attention. The more you know about your
business, the better off you are.
CONCLUSION

It is clear that each business has sectors with different trends, different
margins, different rates of growth, different risks. Breaking these out for the
investor, showing comparative profits year after year, should result in more
precise and more accurate study of economic factors. With knowledge and
understanding, we may improve the investment process. Indeed, it is the
writer's hope that we now have a significant and powerful new tool that
will be invaluable in future years.

